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ABSTRACT 
Purpose. Business angels are often the first external source from which entrepreneurial ventures 
can secure financing. In addition to providing financial capital, business angels are known for their 
extensive value adding involvement in the portfolio ventures. This research seeks to map the effects 
of value added by business angels to the performance of new ventures in Sweden. 
Methodology. Using a dataset of 41 Swedish ventures backed by business angels, this master thesis 
employs a regression analysis to evaluate the effects of four value adding roles; the sounding board 
and strategic role, resource acquisition role, supervision and monitoring role, and mentoring role; 
to the entrepreneur’s perceived performance of their firm. 
Findings. The study’s findings conclude there is a significant relationship between value added 
and new venture performance. The data provides supporting evidence of a positive effect of the 
sounding board and strategic role, as well as resource acquisition role, on performance. In contrast, 
supervision and monitoring was found to have a negative effect on venture performance and 
mentoring had no significant effect in either direction. 
Implications. The results suggest that entrepreneurs and business angels could benefit from better 
communication of value added expectations. The data further implies that certain value adding 
roles have a stronger effect on performance than do others. 
Contribution. Prior empirical studies have not mapped theoretical value added by business angels 
to perceived performance of the ventures. This paper thus adds insights into the complex value 
adding relationship between entrepreneurs and their business angels. 
ARTICLE INFORMATION 
Keywords: Business Angel; Value Added; Informal Venture Capital; Venture Performance 
Article History: Received 29 May 2015 
Supervisor: Dr. Diamanto Politis 
                                                 
1 halstead.christina@gmail.com; +46 (0)72 5043397 
2 ragna.landgren@gmail.com; +46 (0)70 2139985 
 2 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful for the helpful feedback and contributions received by supervisors 
Dr. Diamanto Politis and faculty member Craig Mitchell, as well as input from colleagues. We 
would also like to extend our gratitude to Dr. Jonas Gabrielsson for his support and advice 
when building the regression model.  
Further, we would like to thank each and every entrepreneur who participated in our study 
and responded to the questionnaire. Their valuable experiences and insights have contributed 
to the better understanding of the relationship between entrepreneurs and business angels, both 
in theory and practice.  
 3 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements 2 
Table of Contents 3 
1. Introduction 4 
2. Theoretical Framework 6 
2.1 Measuring New Venture Performance 6 
2.2 Business Angels – What do we know? 8 
2.3 Value Adding Roles 10 
3. Research Methodology 15 
3.1 Research Design 15 
3.2 The Questionnaire 15 
3.3 Data Sampling 19 
3.4 Data Analysis 21 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 26 
4. Analysis and Results 28 
4.1 Regression Analysis 28 
5. Discussion 33 
5.1 Limitations 34 
5.2 Implications 36 
5.3 Further Research 39 
6. Conclusion 40 
References 42 
Appendices 48 
Appendix I: Cover Letter 48 
Appendix II: The Questionnaire 49 
 
 4 
1. Introduction 
The role of business angels and the value they add to firms as investors has been widely 
discussed in industry when observing the performance and growth of new ventures. However, 
there remains a limited body of academic research into the value added by business angels 
(Lumme, Mason, and Soumi, 1998; Mason, 2006; Kelly, 2007; Politis, 2008). The studies that 
do exist often have varying definitions of what constitutes as value added and how to measure 
its value. They also use different underlying theoretical approaches to connect theory to what 
is observed in practice. Thus, while there exists a body of theoretical knowledge on the value 
added by business angels, it remains fragmented. This study uses Tyebjee and Bruno’s (1984) 
definition of value added: “any activity provided by a business angel that is unrelated to 
supplying personal financial capital”. 
Developed studies that focus on the categorisation of the types of value added by investors 
in new ventures primarily focus on venture capitalists (e.g. Brettel, 2003; MacMillan, Kulow, 
and Khoylian, 1989). Part of this is due to the more informal nature of business angel 
investments. They are difficult to identify which makes the collection of data on their activities 
difficult for research. Although there are studies that take an empirical look at business angels 
and value added (Ehrlich, De Noble, Moore, and Weaver, 1994; Mason and Harrison, 1996), 
these studies often do not look into how value added activities affect new venture performance 
and do not focus on the perspective of the entrepreneur. Landström (1993), in part, does 
empirically discuss a select few value added activities of business angels and venture 
performance in Sweden. However, the study focuses on the characterisation of business angels 
and takes the point of view of the angel where performance satisfaction is measured by the 
return on their investment.  
Overall, previous research on value added has mainly taken the business angel’s/venture 
capitalist’s perspective (Harrison and Mason, 1992; Stevenson and Coveney, 1996; Lumme, 
Mason, and Soumi, 1998; Ardichvili, Cardozo, Tune, and Reinach, 2002; Paul, Whittam, and 
Johnston, 2003) and this can be misleading. We argue the two parties – the value added giver 
and the value added receiver – have different perceptions of what constitutes as value added. 
The entrepreneur’s perspective should be further investigated since it is the venture that is in 
need of the value added, and the entrepreneur tends to have a closer understanding of its needs 
as they relate to long-term goals. Taking the point of view of the entrepreneur can provide a 
better gauge of the true level of value that business angels add rather than the perceived value 
that business angels assume they provide. There remains a gap in the current literature for a 
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quantitative investigation into the value added by business angels and its relationship on 
performance from the perspective of the entrepreneur. Therefore, this study aims to answer the 
question: Does the value added by business angels affect new venture performance? 
The intention of this study is to empirically map the value added by business angels that is 
observed in real ventures to the firm’s performance in order to add to the theoretical literature 
on business angels and value added. In turn, this will provide a richer understanding of the 
relationship between business angels and entrepreneurs in practice. Using already established 
theoretical frameworks (e.g. Wetzel, 1981, 1983; Ehrlich et al., 1994; DeClercq, Fried, 
Lehtonen, and Sapienza, 2006; Politis, 2008), this research aims to add to the greater 
entrepreneurial literature by providing a quantitative framework and method into the 
investigation on value added activities of business angels and the resulting effect it has on the 
performance of firms from the entrepreneur's perspective. The study looks at 41 ventures in 
Sweden that have received business angel funding between 2000 and 2014. Data was collected 
through a survey adapted from the questionnaire designs of MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian 
(1989). The study is referred to as the reference study throughout the rest of the text. Since 
different new ventures have different needs, our study looks at perceived value added. 
In the remainder of this thesis, we discuss the theoretical framework of business angel and 
value added on which our quantitative analysis is based, the methodology employed to conduct 
the research, and the results of the empirical data collection. Then, a discussion of the 
limitations and implications of our results have on research is presented. The study ends by 
providing recommendations for entrepreneurs, business angels, and researchers then closes 
with final conclusions. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
In order to understand if value added by business angels affects performance of new ventures 
it is essential to first understand how performance is measured and why business angels are an 
important factor when doing so. This chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings of 
performance measures in startups, and then continues on to defining business angels and their 
characteristics along with the different value adding roles they can assume. The current 
situation in industry and relevant theories are discussed and previous research is analysed. Each 
of the four subsections discussing the different value adding roles conclude with a number of 
hypotheses to be tested in this study. 
2.1 Measuring New Venture Performance 
Because business angels typically are the first external financiers for entrepreneurs and 
their ventures, the general consensus in literature is that business angels impact the 
performance of their portfolio companies (e.g. Pape, 2014; Chua and Wu, 2012). Chua and Wu 
(2012) found that business angels contribute significantly to the enhanced performance of their 
investee firm, yet other studies conclude that the effects of this contribution on performance 
are highly dependent on what performance metrics are used and over which time frame they 
are measured (Mason and Harrison, 2002). Hence, it is critical to understand how performance 
is measured in order to assess the direction and magnitude through which business angels can 
influence it. The following section will discuss challenges with measuring new venture 
performance as well as what different metrics are commonly used. 
Limitations of smallness and newness can make it difficult to measure the performance of 
new ventures. The difficulties arise because new ventures often lack significant and 
representative historical data upon which traditional financial performance metrics, such as 
sales and turnover, are based. However, performance can also be measured on a non-financial 
basis by looking at metrics related to customer satisfaction, retention rates, and delivery time. 
Such metrics tend to be more reliant than financial performance metrics in the short run 
(Wiklund, Davidsson, and Delmar, 2003). Founders and managers of new ventures, therefore, 
tend to use a hybrid approach of equally emphasising financial and non-financial metrics when 
evaluating their performance (Gin Chong, 2008). Although performance literature presents 
several theoretical frameworks that take different perspectives on performance, the goal 
approach – measuring the extent to which an organisation attains its goals – is by far the most 
commonly used to measure performance in new ventures due to its simplicity and ease of 
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access to information (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983; Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967; Gin 
Chong, 2008). Allowing performance to be measured against internally set goals, which are 
based on the founder’s own interests and capabilities to achieve them, makes the goal approach 
the best fit for evaluating performance in new ventures (Gin Chong, 2008). Therefore, this 
study will take a goal approach when measuring financial and non-financial performance by 
placing an equal emphasis on the two performance categories.  
Regarding the selection of performance variables, previous research concludes that both 
short- and long-term measurements should be incorporated in performance evaluations in order 
to provide a holistic measure (Delmar, McKelvie, and Wennberg, 2013; Kirchhoff, 1977; 
Wiklund, Davidsson, and Delmar, 2003). Mason and Harrison (2002) claim that it is not 
uncommon for investments to have an immediate negative effect on performance of ventures, 
and that positive effects may not be observed until five to six years after the investment has 
occurred. Hence, there is a need for performance metrics that span across different time 
horizons to accommodate for this complexity. Commonly reoccurring metrics that are 
measureable over various time horizons are sales volume, net profit, number of employees, 
customer retention rate, and market share. This combination of traditional financial 
performance measures and more subjective non-financial measures allows entrepreneurs to 
capture and compare their performance on a wider scale by taking into account their 
competitiveness and place in the market (Begley and Boyd, 1987; Covin and Slevin, 1989). In 
a similar study on value added by venture capitalists, MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1989) 
investigate the relationship between value added and venture performance based on market 
share, return on investment, sales volume, and net profits. As the study takes the venture 
capitalist’s perspective on performance, measuring return on investment is justified. This study 
is focused on capturing the entrepreneur’s perspective on performance and it would therefore 
make less sense to incorporate the return on investment as a performance metric. The 
performance metrics used in this study are: sales volume, market share, net profits, number of 
employees and customer retention rate. 
Furthermore, MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1989) along with Zammuto (1984) 
acknowledge the difficulties of objectively measuring performance and so justify the use of 
subjective performance measures, particularly with respect to new ventures. Due to liabilities 
of newness as well as the lack of publicly reported data of new ventures, it is difficult to obtain 
objective performance measurements in the early years of a firm (Gin Chong, 2008). By 
allowing the entrepreneurs to provide their version of perceived performance, this issue can be 
overcome. In the aforementioned study on venture capitalists and value added, the venture 
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capitalists were asked to subjectively rate the performance of their investees. The results 
revealed that the ventures, on average, performed below expectations on all four performance 
criteria, indicating that no bias existed toward reporting only the successful ventures. 
Therefore, previous studies in the field of value added and performance metrics justify the use 
of subjective measurements and this study will hereafter consider and measure the 
entrepreneur’s perception of value added and performance. The subjective data, nevertheless, 
should be treated carefully. A separate means analysis will be conducted on the performance 
measurements in order to detect the presence of such a bias in this study. 
2.2 Business Angels – What do we know? 
Business angels (BAs) constitute the most significant source of investment in startups and 
innovations, collectively investing more than 3 billon SEK in Swedish ventures annually 
(Tillväxtverket, 2015). This has caused an increased interest amongst entrepreneurs, 
researchers and decision makers alike to seek more understanding of the BA investment and 
role. In order to investigate the possible effects that BA value adding activities may have on 
new venture performance, the term business angel must first be clearly defined. The terms 
‘business angel’ and ‘informal investor’ are often used interchangeably throughout literature, 
yet we believe that this discrepancy causes confusion. The relationship between the investor 
and investee is undefined for informal investor, meaning that the term can include family, 
friends and colleagues as well as unrelated individuals. The definition of business angel is more 
restrictive, thereby making it easier to identify them. We will consider business angels 
according to the following definition throughout the remainder of this study: “An individual, 
unrelated to the entrepreneur, who invests a proportion of his/her own assets in the venture. 
Apart from investing financial capital business angels also provide value added in various 
forms, e.g. commercial skills, experience, business know-how and industry networks.” (Freear, 
Sohl, and Wetzel, 1994; Mason and Harrison, 1995). 
Despite the definition stating that BAs are individuals, it is increasingly common that more 
than one BA will collectively partner with other BAs to make a single investment in a venture, 
referred to as a syndicated BA investment (Jääskeläinen, 2012; UK Business Angel 
Association, 2015). Through syndication, BAs can spread the monetary risks as well as bring 
together angels with different individual business experiences that can positively influence the 
success of an early-stage venture. It should also be noted that a venture might also receive 
investments from multiple individual BAs, simultaneously, without it being a syndicate 
investment. Previously, BA activity has been hampered due to the invisible nature of angels 
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and consequently difficulties of matching BAs to entrepreneurs arise (Mason and Harrison, 
2000; Reitan and Sørheim, 2000; Sørheim and Landström, 2001). The invisible nature of BAs 
makes it difficult for them to communicate their investment preferences and areas of expertise, 
which contribute to information asymmetry in matchmaking. This leads to an increased 
complexity of collecting data in the research field. Syndicate investments typically are better 
at facilitating in this matching process because they are primarily initiated through established 
business angel networks (Aernoudt and Erikson, 2002). Business angel networks (BANs) act 
as intermediaries between individual BAs and entrepreneurs, with the main objective to 
facilitate angel investments. BANs are becoming increasingly popular (Politis, 2008), 
particularly, amongst the new and relatively inexperienced BAs. However, certain studies have 
found syndication to have a negative impact on the degree of angel involvement due to the 
duplication of efforts and free-riding behaviour amongst angels (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and 
Hellmann, 2008). Further, the study found that syndication has a positive impact on venture 
performance, yet a negative moderating effect. This study and future studies must take into 
consideration the changing investment environment and incorporate syndicate investments and 
BANs into their analyses.   
It is not only the method of investing - individually, as syndication, or multiple individuals 
- that differs between BAs. In fact, extensive research has been undertaken to identify the 
characteristics of BAs and has revealed that they are an extremely heterogeneous group 
(DeClercq et al., 2006; Kelly, 2007; Swedish Agency for Growth Analysis, 2013; Fili and 
Grünberg, 2014). Nevertheless, a study by Kelly (2007), focusing on identifying generalities 
amongst the heterogeneous angels, identifies certain common characteristics. BAs tend to be 
wealthy, middle-aged men with entrepreneurial backgrounds who invest in geographically 
close ventures and often together with other angels. Kelly’s results are supported by findings 
from Landström (1993) that found 96% of all BAs, in Sweden, have previous startup 
experience and their investment activity is influenced by their prior industry knowledge. Kelly 
(2007) also found that angels can have different intentions with their investments and therefore 
categorises them accordingly: the financial angel, the altruistic angel and the self-oriented 
angel. 
Based on the identified characteristics, previous research indicates that BAs can contribute 
much more than pure financial resources when investing in a venture (Mason, 2006; Kelly, 
2007; DeClercq et al., 2006), yet few studies exist that conceptualise such value adding 
contributions (Lumme, Mason, and Soumi, 1998). Kelly (2007) enforces the importance of 
value added by business angels, but fails to identify various value adding activities they are 
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involved in. DeClercq et al. (2006) concentrate on defining value added in the institutional 
venture capital market and claim that value added, in certain cases, may be the primary reason 
for seeking venture capital. The authors take their argument one step further and identify six 
common value adding roles of venture capitalists: strategic role; financing role; networking 
role; interpersonal role; reputational role; and discipline role. MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian 
(1989) extend the literature on value added by venture capitalists by relating it to perceived 
performance. They found that venture capitalists most commonly serve as a sounding board to 
the venture’s management team, thereby making the strategic role most pronounced. This was 
also the role that resulted in the highest performance according to the study.  
MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian’s (1989) article looks at the perceived value added and 
performance from the venture capital’s perspective – the opposite perspective that this study 
investigates. However, there are many similarities between the motivation of our study and 
their article. Thus, a number of learnings and devices are adapted from their article, such as the 
design of the questionnaire and the different value adding activities occurring in new ventures. 
These are used to complement the existing business angel literature on value added. Politis 
(2008) provides an extensive literature review of 14 studies on value added by business angels 
in different countries between 1992 and 2005. The study results in the categorisation of value 
adding activities into four roles: sounding board and strategic role; resource acquisition role; 
supervision and monitoring role; and mentoring role. This study’s theoretical framework will 
be based upon these four roles, which will be individually discussed in the next section.  
2.3 Value Adding Roles 
Because of the value added by business angels, for example sharing their entrepreneurial 
network and management expertise, Kelly (2007) defines angel money as “smart money”. 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) were among the first to discuss value adding activities in BA 
literature, defining it as any activities that are unrelated to supplying personal financial capital. 
Since then, attempts have been made to define value adding activities and assess their impact 
on new venture performance but such studies have previously been limited by small, 
unrepresentative samples and are often limited to descriptive rather than analytical 
methodologies (Da Rin and Penas, 2011).  This study will base the research on the four main 
value adding roles identified by Politis (2008). Angels can be involved in all four roles 
simultaneously but are typically more active in some roles than others. The four roles and their 
respective value adding activities are shown in Table 1. This categorisation of activities and 
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roles form the framework for this study and is based on previous literature (e.g. Politis, 2008; 
MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian, 1989). 
 
Table 1: The Four Value Adding Roles and their Activities 
Value Adding Roles and Activities  
Sounding Board and Strategic Role 
- Formulating business strategy 
- Serving as sounding board 
- Formulating marketing plans 
- Developing product or service 
- Industry knowledge 
Resource Acquisition Role 
- Searching for candidates for the management team 
- Interviewing and selecting the management team 
- Networking activities 
- Finding and obtaining additional sources of capital 
- Interfacing with investor groups 
Supervision and Monitoring Role 
- Monitoring financial performance 
- Monitoring operational performance 
- Soliciting customers, suppliers and distributors 
- Managing crises and problems 
- Reporting and control 
Mentoring Role 
- Professional relationship with the entrepreneur(s) 
- Personal relationship with the entrepreneur(s) 
- Motivating employees 
- Sharing the burden of hardship 
 
2.3.1 Sounding Board and Strategic Role 
The sounding board and strategic role involves being active in making long-term plans for the 
venture and often also being able to contribute to the greater picture of the venture. Such 
activities may include formulating business strategy and marketing plans to achieve long-term 
goals as well as using industry knowledge and entrepreneurial experience to define customer 
segments and identify demand (Politis, 2008). Previous research indicates that this is the most 
frequently reported value adding role (Pape, 2014). As Kelly (2007) and Landström (1993) 
found, previous experience of the BA is of great importance in this role. It is therefore not 
uncommon that the role also involves, to a certain extent, the development of products and/or 
services. Another important activity is serving as a general sounding board to the founders and 
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their management team, something that MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1989) found to be 
the most important contributing factor to new venture success in the venture capital market. A 
firm’s internal environment is key to establishing a sustainable competitive advantage and by 
adding value through a sounding board and strategic role BAs help achieve this (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Hence, this role can be considered a key 
strategic resource for the entrepreneur and the portfolio company with the potential to add 
significant value. Based on these findings the following hypothesis will be tested regarding the 
relationship between the value added through the sounding board and strategic role and venture 
performance. 
 
H1. There is a positive relationship between the sounding board and strategic value adding 
role of a business angel and venture performance. 
2.3.2 Resource Acquisition Role  
Early research in BA contributions often address the initial financial capital offered by these 
informal investors. Business angels often focus on how ventures can create and maintain a 
stable flow of key resources in the firm by providing the entrepreneur with access to their 
personal networks (Ardichvili et al., 2002). Startups must be capable of linking the venture to 
its external environment because the success of a startup is heavily dependent on establishing 
lasting relationships and building long-term networks (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As such, 
the resource acquisition role is theoretically supported by the resource dependency theory 
(Politis, 2008). Ventures should take control over critical relationships and assets to reduce 
dependencies, yet the ability to do so is often significantly increased when supported by a BA. 
Sørheim (2005) takes the connection of BA activities and resource dependency theory further 
by looking at how BAs add value by taking a resource acquisition role in the firm to assist in 
further financing. Overall, the study communicates that the behaviour of facilitating further 
finance is highly affected by the previous business record of investing done by the angel. This 
is important to note while researching the value added role of BAs because it takes into 
consideration the past experience of the BA and how it affects the impact of the value they add. 
In practice, BAs contribute with this kind of value added by assisting in recruiting the 
management team, offering networking opportunities, and helping to obtain further financial 
capital (Politis, 2008). Based on these findings, the following hypothesis will be tested 
regarding the relationship between the value added through the resource acquisition role and 
venture performance. 
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H2. There is a positive relationship between the resource acquisition value adding role of 
a business angel and venture performance. 
2.3.3 Supervision and Monitoring Role 
Supervision and monitoring by investors is performed to protect the investment from 
managerial misbehaviour and moral hazard (Van Osnabrugge, 2000). Business angels often do 
so by seeking out opportunities within their area of expertise. Industry knowledge facilitates 
the overseeing of operating matters and protection of assets, and as such the value added can 
be maximised to provide maximum economic gains for both investor and investee. Politis 
(2008) and Fili and Grünberg (2014) suggest that the tendency for BAs to have a high level of 
previous industry experience may be related to investment governance and agency theory 
because the more industry experience the angel has the easier it is to control the investment. 
DeClercq et al. (2006) make a similar finding when evaluating the value adding roles of venture 
capitalists, namely that the disciplinary role is enhanced by relevant previous experience and 
contributes to continuous evaluation and control such that the investor ensures the agreed 
objectives are attained. In practical terms, this role includes monitoring financial and 
operational performance, as well as soliciting customers, suppliers and distributors (Politis, 
2008). This commonly occurs by instituting proper accounting and reporting systems 
(Mitchell, Reid, and Terry, 1997) or by taking a place on the venture’s board (Gabrielsson and 
Huse, 2002). Based on these findings, the following hypothesis will be tested regarding the 
relationship between the value added through the supervision and monitoring role and venture 
performance. 
 
H3. There is a positive relationship between the supervision and monitoring value adding 
role of a business angel and venture performance. 
2.3.4 Mentoring Role 
Mentoring corresponds to how BAs take on a coaching role in order to guide less experienced 
entrepreneurs through the growth process of a firm. Business angels can add value both on a 
professional and personal level by building lasting, fruitful relationships, and by being an open 
and trustful partner to their investee companies (Brettel, 2003; Sætre, 2003). The role may also 
include motivating personnel and sharing the burden of hardship (Politis, 2008). Although 
focused on the German market, Brettel (2003) takes a look into the behaviour of BAs and how 
they provide advice and support to their respective investee companies. The study found that 
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most BAs in Germany take the role as mentor due to their motivation to help their firms and 
for their own personal enjoyment. Sætre (2003) and Lindsay (2004) argue that BAs often see 
themselves as entrepreneurs and because of this they should not be considered solely as 
financiers but as co-entrepreneurs and mentors. This can be related back to the categorisations 
presented by Kelly (2007) on the BA’s intentions with the investment. However, previous 
literature reveals that it is highly important that the entrepreneur and angel have similar 
characteristics and personal traits in order to strengthen the mentoring connection between the 
two parties (Pape, 2014). Based on these findings, the following hypothesis will be tested 
regarding the relationship between the value added through the mentoring role and venture 
performance. 
 
H4. There is a positive relationship between the mentoring value adding role of a business 
angel and venture performance. 
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3. Research Methodology 
This chapter seeks to explain the research methodology of the study, including the research 
design that underpins this research. The methodology further encompasses the data collection, 
data sampling, and data analysis and interpretation. The chapter will justify the use of certain 
methods for data sampling, collection and analysis. The chapter concludes with a brief 
discussion of the ethical considerations made during the design of the research. 
3.1 Research Design 
This research implements a cross-sectional design to collect data from multiple respondents at 
a set point in time to quantify the relationship between the investigated variables. The objective 
of the research is not to quantify the effects of business angel value added on performance over 
time, but rather to investigate the relationship at a set point in time, which is why a cross-
sectional research design is appropriate (Bryman and Bell, 2011). This study makes use of a 
questionnaire for data collection because of the relative simplicity and speed at which the large 
amount of data necessary for an analysis can be collected when compared to interviews 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). The research draws upon existing literature’s categorisation of value 
added by business angels (Politis, 2008; MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian, 1989; DeClercq et 
al., 2006). Hence, the underlying dimensions of value added have been collected from previous 
studies within the field, as detailed in the previous chapter. The intention of this study is to 
empirically map a pre-defined set of value added activities performed by BAs to the 
entrepreneur’s perceived performance of the company while basing the study on real ventures. 
This research is therefore considered to be deductive by seeking to capture the entrepreneur’s 
perceptions and observations of value added by their business angel(s) and thereafter analysing 
the relationship between value adding roles and venture performance. This in turn will allow 
for the possible confirmation of our hypotheses and add to the existing body of literature. 
3.2 The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is designed to incorporate the value adding activities identified in previous 
research while using a number of different methods of measuring new venture performance. 
The aim with the questionnaire is to collect quantifiable data that can be used to test our 
hypotheses and is designed accordingly. This study considers the entrepreneur as the focal 
point and collected observations perceived by the entrepreneur. A questionnaire designed for 
a similar study on the correlation between value added by institutional venture capitalists and 
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venture performance (MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian, 1989) was used as a framework when 
designing the questionnaire for this study. Due to the similarities in research questions between 
this study and the reference study, it was considered appropriate to use the reference study as 
a model when designing the questionnaire for this research. The reference survey contains four 
sections: general venture information, investment specific information, value added 
information and performance indicators. Three of the four sections are employed in this study, 
while the second ‘investment information’ was changed to ‘general business angel 
information’. However, the reference study used the venture capitalist as the focal point, 
constituting a major difference in research objective. The layout of this questionnaire is 
therefore altered to take this into consideration. The content design of each individual section 
of the questionnaire is detailed in Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.4. 
Two external parties validated the design and content of the questionnaire before it was 
distributed. Amendments were made afterwards and the questionnaire finalised. These parties 
were a seasoned BA and an entrepreneur from an early-stage startup that received BA funding. 
An important point brought up by the external parties was the incorporation of ventures that 
had received multiple rounds of investments and/or investments from multiple angels and 
syndicates. These were considered by the two reviewing parties to have an impact on the value 
added by BAs. The two external parties were excluded from taking part in the study itself. The 
questionnaire was created through the online tool Typeform to facilitate user interaction and 
compilation of the results. All questions in the survey were compulsory in order to successfully 
submit a response to ensure no entries were accidentally left blank. In addition, the room for 
interpretation was minimised by only asking closed questions. Distribution was through email 
and included a cover letter and link to the questionnaire. The cover letter was included to ensure 
all ethical considerations of the study were met, something that is discussed in the last section 
of this chapter. A sample of the cover letter is provided in Appendix I. Reminders were sent 
out one week after the initial distribution to the proportion of the sample who had yet to 
participate in the study. A sample of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix II. 
3.2.1 Survey, Section 1 - General venture information 
This section sought to collect venture specific information. The name of the company and the 
position of the respondent within the venture were only used to monitor which sample 
participant had responded. The founding year and location of the venture were collected to 
ensure the venture met the inclusion criteria for the study (inclusion criteria is further discussed 
in the subsequent section of this chapter). Regarding the industry, the respondents were asked 
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to select an industry from a given set of alternatives. The industry alternatives were defined 
according to Retriever Business (2015), although certain very similar industries were grouped 
together to narrow the range of selection. Provided the definition of BAs introduced in Section 
2.2, the entrepreneurs were asked to indicate whether they had received BA funding for the 
venture they were responding on behalf of. The section concluded with a question regarding 
the form of BA investment, whether it was an individual BA, a syndicate investment or multiple 
individual BAs. The importance of this question was to identify if more than one BA was active 
within the venture. If so, the respondent was asked to complete the remainder of the 
questionnaire with respect to the most active BA only to minimise the complexity of analysing 
value added by multiple BAs. 
3.2.2 Survey, Section 2 - General business angel information 
In this section more specific information regarding the BA and investment were collected. The 
date and amount of initial investment formed the basis of the section, with the investment size 
being collected in range groups from <100,000 SEK to >500,000 SEK to respect the investment 
confidentiality most ventures have with their angel. The range of investment size was 
determined according to the range of typical BA investments found in literature (DeClercq et 
al., 2006; Kelly, 2007). A follow-up question, regarding potential subsequent rounds of 
funding, collected information concerning the total amount of angel investment provided - the 
number of investment rounds and the date of the latest investment. Whether the BA held a 
position on the venture’s board and the size of the angel’s equity share were both considered 
as important background information to evaluate the BA’s level of involvement in the venture. 
The respondents were asked to quantify the dedication in hours per week the angel committed. 
Literature indicates that the higher the amount invested the higher the level of equity share a 
BA tends to receive, which in turn motivates the BA to take a more active role on the board 
and dedicate more hours on each investment (DeClercq et al., 2006; Kelly, 2007). Three 
YES/NO questions regarding the BA’s previous experience were included as previous research 
shows that the behaviour of BAs is highly related to their professional background (DeClercq 
et al., 2006; Kelly, 2007). Lastly, the stage of development at initial investment was categorised 
into seed stage, early stage, expansion stage, and mature stage. 
3.2.3 Survey, Section 3 - Quantification of value adding activities 
In order to quantify the level of value added, the entrepreneurs were asked to indicate the 
perceived level of value added by their BA in 19 activities on a scale from 1 to 5.  
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The scale was graded as follows: 
1 - No value added; 
2 - Low value added; 
3 - Acceptable value added; 
4 - High value added; 
5 - Exceptional value added. 
 
The 19 activities were sub-activities of the four main value adding roles. Sounding board 
and strategy, resource acquisition, and supervision and monitoring contained five activities 
each. Mentoring contained four activities. The 19 activities were determined by compiling the 
results of 14 independent articles in the field of value added by BAs, and are outlined in Table 
1. Hence, all activities quantified in this study were based on a thorough review of value adding 
literature and corresponded to activities already observed in real angel-venture interaction. The 
activities were also crosschecked with the activities investigated in the reference survey and 
the activities were very coherent.  
3.2.4 Survey, Section 4 - Venture Performance 
In the last section, the respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of their venture. 
They were asked to provide a subjective opinion on five different performance metrics 
regarding the venture’s perceived actual performance compared to what was expected. The 
metrics were determined by reviewing literature on measuring new venture performance and 
the compilation of the conclusions from the MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1989) reference 
study and an article by Wiklund, Davidsson, and Delmar (2003). The articles acknowledge the 
difficulties of measuring new venture performance due to the lack of reporting requirements 
and availability of performance data early in the business life cycle. The five metrics used were 
sales volume, market share, net profit, number of employees and customer retention. Again, a 
five-point scale was implemented to enhance consistency throughout the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
The scale was graded as follows: 
1 - Far below expectations; 
2 - Below expectations; 
3 - Achieved expectations; 
4 - Above expectations; 
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5 - Far above expectations. 
3.3 Data Sampling 
Due to the anonymous and invisible nature of the BA population, data sampling is an 
acknowledged issue within the field of BA research (Harrison and Mason, 2008; Farrell, 
Howorth, and Wright, 2008; Avdeitchikova, Landström, and Månsson, 2008). Consequently, 
many previous studies have been unable to generate representative samples, but rather relied 
on convenience samples. Discrepancies in the definition of BAs and the interchangeable use 
of the terms ‘business angel’ and ‘informal investor’ has contributed to further difficulties in 
generating a representative, random sample (Avdeitchikova, Landström, and Månsson, 2008). 
These issues are of importance as the respondents were asked to indicate whether they have 
received business angel funding. To minimise the risk of discrepancies in the results of this 
study due to variation in BA definitions, a number of inclusion criteria were established. These 
are detailed in Table 2. The population for this survey are all ventures that meet these inclusion 
criteria. 
Responses were excluded from the data set according to the exclusion criteria if BA 
funding had been received for other ventures than the one currently employed by, if the venture 
was located outside Sweden, if more than fifteen years had passed since the venture’s founding, 
and if the amount invested subceeded 100 000 SEK as this is the lower boundary for business 
angel investment according to literature (DeClercq et al., 2006; Kelly, 2007). It should be noted 
that no criteria was set for the location of the business angel, only the venture. 
 
Table 2: Inclusion Criteria 
 
Due to the acknowledged difficulties in collecting a truly random sample within the field 
of BA research and the difficulty in identifying potential companies started in Sweden since 
2000 that have received BA funding, a convenience sampling technique was chosen. Only 
ventures with publicly announced BA funding were targeted to reduce the risk of contacting a 
large selection of ventures with unknown presence of BA funding. These public 
Variable Description 
Business Angel Funding Have received business angel funding, per the 
definition of business angel provided in section 2.2 
in this paper, for the venture reported on. 
Amount Invested Minimum 100 000 SEK. 
Age of Venture Maximum 15 years. 
Geographical Location of Venture Sweden. 
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announcements were available to us through various social media sites and professional 
networks of BAs. 
 
The sampling process occurred in two stages: 
1) Identification – Identifying potential sample subjects. 
2) Verification and information gathering – Verifying that the subjects meet the inclusion 
criteria. If so, collect information through the online questionnaire. 
 
Potential ventures were identified via a number of different sources; established business 
angel networks (BANs) and incubators, as well as through online professional networks. The 
different sampling channels are specified in Table 3. Connect Skåne, STING Business Angels 
(SBA), Stockholm Affärsänglar and Roslagens Affärsänglar are some of the largest BA 
networks in Sweden. Apart from SBA, the networks include angels and entrepreneurs from all 
kinds of industries and ventures. SBA, on the other hand, mainly focuses on high-growth tech-
startups. One limitation of these BA networks is the tendency among all four networks to only 
invest within their local region. Nevertheless, as they are distributed in three different regions 
(two in Stockholm, one in Roslagen and one in Skåne) the geographical spread of the sample 
is increased. Furthermore, three online startup networks were accessed – AngelList, 
Crowdsource List and Malmö Startups. Although global, the two former networks allow 
filtering on investments and startups in specific countries and thereby the Swedish market 
could be targeted. One incubator was contacted, STING, but due to confidentiality 
requirements no official lists could be provided for this research. However, STING did reveal 
a number of their companies that sit in their incubator with BA investment along with their 
contact information via the incubator’s external website. Additionally, Swedish BAs and 
ventures were identified using the open and online professional network LinkedIn. Lastly, at 
the end of the questionnaire the respondents were asked to indicate potential participants in 
their own network by providing names of the potential participating ventures. Hence, a chain 
effect was created (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Using several different sources when generating 
the sample minimises the limitations of sampling through convenience, and therefore the 
representativeness of our sample is enhanced.  Nevertheless, it remains to be verified whether 
the sample is representative of the entire population of ventures with BA funding as the 
different sources also have similar characteristics. 
Once identified, the location and age of a venture was verified through the Swedish 
business information database Retriever Business (2015). The respondent verified all four 
 21 
inclusion criteria (location, age, and receiving BA funding of min. 100 000 SEK) in the 
questionnaire, but no official verification of the size of the investment and the presence of BA 
were made due to deal confidentiality agreements between venture and angel. The identified 
and verified sample was managed through an Excel-database. The database included 114 
potential respondents, however 11 respondents were excluded due to not actually having 
received BA funding, making the sample size 103 ventures. The targeted response rate was 
48% in order to generate 50 respondents, yet only 41 responses – response rate of 40% – was 
reached. The various response rates per distribution channel are illustrated in Table 3, ranging 
from 0% to 67%.  
 
Table 3: Sources of Sample Ventures and Response Rates 
Name Type Location Sample Responses Response 
rate 
AngelList Startup Network Global   2   1 50% 
Connect Skåne BAN Skåne   25 12 48% 
Crowdsource List Startup Network Global   2   1 50% 
LinkedIn Open Network Global  11   2 18% 
Malmö Startups Startup Network Malmö   6   4 67% 
Roslagens Affärsänglar BAN Roslagen   3   2 67% 
STING Incubator Stockholm   5   2 40% 
STING Business Angels BAN Stockholm  39   16 41% 
Stockholm Affärsänglar BAN Stockholm   7     0 0% 
Questionnaire referrals Referrals Sweden   3     1 33% 
Total 103 41 40% 
Notes: BAN=Business Angel Network    
3.4 Data Analysis 
3.4.1 Regression Analysis 
The data collected from survey responses was analysed in a hierarchical two-step multivariate 
regression analysis to model the relationship between the four value added categories and new 
venture performance while controlling for other possible relationships. Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse the 41 observations. The first defining set of 
variables ran in the model were the four control variables (IT Industry, Involvement Frequency, 
Syndicate, and Angel Experience) in order to see potential affects the variables had on the 
dependent variable (Performance). This was followed by the additional inclusion of the four 
independent explanatory variables (Sounding Board & Strategic, Resource Acquisition, 
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Supervision & Monitoring, and Mentoring) that were constructed from the 19 attributes 
defining the value adding activities of BAs found in the survey (see Table 1). Cronbach’s alpha 
was used for reliability analysis to construct composite dependent and independent variables. 
All alpha values were well above the accepted standard threshold of α = .70 (Nunnally, 
1978), indicating a high level of internal consistency for all items included in each of composite 
variable scaling. Explanation of variables used in our regression model plus results of variable 
scaling are discussed below while regression results are presented in Tables 7 and 8.  
 
Dependent Variable 
Performance. The composite dependent variable of the perceived performance of the firm 
measured with a five-item, 5-point Likert scale. Respondents were asked to rank the level of 
perceived performance of the firm since the BA investment (α = .84)  
 
Independent Variables 
Sounding Board & Strategic. The first composite independent variable of activities relating 
to the value added by BAs in a sounding board and strategic role. Variable measured with a 
five-item, 5-point Likert scale (α = .81). 
Resource Acquisition. The second composite independent variable of activities relating to 
the value added by BAs in a resource acquisition role. Variable measured with a five-item, 5-
point Likert scale (α = .86). 
Supervision & Monitoring. The third composite independent variable of activities relating 
to the value added by BAs in a supervision and monitoring role. Variable measured with a five-
item, 5-point Likert scale (α = .87). 
Mentoring. The fourth composite independent variable of activities relating to the value 
added by BAs in a mentoring role. Variable measured with a four-item, 5-point Likert scale (α 
= .92). 
 
 
Control Variables 
Controls were selected based on past studies’ theoretical findings of which variables, related 
to BAs and the firm, potentially have an effect on new venture performance. In one previous 
study, the involvement frequency was reported to be positively associated with the level of 
value added as well as performance (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007). The more time the investor 
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commits to its portfolio venture, the higher the performance. The control variable, Involvement 
Frequency, was included to represent this effect after it was found to be both statistically 
significant while having an increasing effect on the accuracy of our model. In addition, as 
previously revealed, it can take time before the performance effects of angel investments 
become observable and measurable. Negative effects of angel investments tend to appear, on 
average, two years after the investment, whereas positive effects may not appear until five to 
six years after (Mason and Harrison, 2002). Therefore, one can assume that the longer the time 
has passed since the investment, the more likely it is of high firm performance. This was not 
added to our model as it did not have an effect on the accuracy of the model nor was it found 
to be statistically significant.  
A key set of variables often discussed in practice and theory is the angel’s background and 
its relation to value added and venture performance. Wiltbank (2009) found that angels with 
entrepreneurial experience gained from personally starting a venture outperform those who had 
not in terms of providing value added. Likewise, Fili and Grünberg (2014) conclude that angels 
with highly relevant industry experience contribute more in terms of access to networks and 
monitoring. However after testing these variables (Industry Experience and Entrepreneurial 
Experience), we found that they had no significant effect on our particular sample and did not 
aid in increasing the accuracy of our model. This plus our attempt to minimise the number of 
predictors because of our relatively small sample is why we choose to exclude these two 
variables and any other control variables that met the same statistical exclusion criteria. 
Conversely, the following variables listed were included as control variables in the model 
because of their statistical significance and effect of increasing accuracy of the model: 
 
IT Industry. This variable indicated whether the venture is in the IT and software industry 
or not. While not detailed or comprehensive, this dummy variable was selected to simplify and 
display the potential affects different industries may have on venture performance or other 
independent variables in the model, (Yes=1, No=0). 
Involvement Frequency. This variable measures how often the angel engages with the 
venture through face meetings or phone calls. Treated as a continuous variable. It is 
acknowledged that this only measures the quantity of involvement and not quality, (0 = < 1 
hour, 1 = 1-5 hours, 2 = 5-10 hours, 3 = 10-15 hours, 4 = 15-20 hours, 5 = > 20 hours). 
Syndicate. This variable indicates whether BA investment was a syndicate investment or 
not, (Yes=1, No=0). 
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Angel Experience. This indicates whether angel has previous experience as a BA or not. To 
keep the number of control variables low, only the BAs previous experience as an angel was 
chosen due to its statistical significance in the model while industry experience and 
entrepreneurial experience were excluded, (Yes=1, No=0). 
3.4.2 Sample Description 
In total, we have 41 responding ventures in our final sample, of which 21 are from the IT 
and software industry (51.2%) and 20 from other industries (48.8%). The responding ventures 
have a mean age of 5.20 years (min=0, max=15), and employs 3.88 people on average (min=1, 
max=38). The participating ventures reported a mean turnover of 1.8 million SEK, with 
individual values ranging from 0 to 14.6 million SEK. In total, 75.6% of the ventures are 
product-based, whereas the remaining 24.4% offer services. Thirty-six ventures (87.8%) 
received BA funding in the seed or early stage and 5 ventures (12.2%) received funding during 
their expansion stage. Of the respondents, 92.7% reported that their BAs were active angels 
prior to the investment, and 80.5% of BAs also had direct startup experience of their own. 
Interestingly, these results seem to support previous literature that the angels tend to be 
seasoned entrepreneurs and invest in several different ventures. Despite previous literature 
strongly arguing for the relevance of the BA’s industry background in relation to value added, 
only 43.9% of the responding ventures considered their BA’s industry background to be 
relevant to the industry of the venture itself. Approximately two thirds of the ventures (70.7%) 
incorporate their angel on the company’s board. Seventeen participating ventures (41.5%) 
received the investment from one individual angel, whereas 18 ventures (43.9%) received 
investments from multiple individual angels, and 6 ventures (14.6%) received a syndicate 
investment. The angels invested, on average, 500,000+ SEK in return for 26.2% of the equity. 
Table 4 provides a summary of the descriptive respondent characteristics. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Respondent Characteristics 
Variable Mean/median Number of ventures   % 
Age 5.20   
Number of employees 3.88   
Turnover (SEK) 1,834,780   
IT and Software  21 51.2% 
Product-based  31 75.6% 
Amount invested (SEK) >500,000 28 68.3% 
Equity 26.2%   
Angel on board  29 70.7% 
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Time of investment 
     Seed/Early stage  36 87.8% 
     Expansion stage    5 12.2% 
Angel background 
     Angel experience  38 92.7% 
     Entrepreneurial experience  33 80.5% 
     Relevant industry experience  18 43.9% 
Type of investment 
     Individual angel  17 41.5% 
     Multiple individual angels  18 43.9% 
     Syndicate   6 14.6% 
 
3.4.3 Non-Response Analysis 
Non-response bias arises if non-respondents differ from respondents according to a number 
of pre-set characteristics (Whitehead, Groothius, and Blomquist, 1993). Although this study 
employs convenience sampling and a relatively small number of participating entrepreneurs, it 
does not necessarily indicate a non-response bias (Grooves, Brick, Couper, Kalsbeek, Harris-
Kojetin, Kreuter, and Wagner, 2008). However, sampling techniques, sample size and response 
rates are commonly used as measures of data quality (Lineback and Thompson, 2010). Thus, 
it is important to carry out a non-response analysis to detect the presence of such a sample 
response bias that could impact the implications of the study. The analysis was based on 
publicly available information from Retriever Business (2015) regarding the sample ventures. 
The variables for the non-response analysis were venture industry, age of venture, number of 
employees and turnover. The characteristics of respondents who returned completed 
questionnaires and non-respondents who failed to do so were compared using difference in 
means tests and Pearson chi-square tests and were defined statistically significant according to 
a 95% confidence limit. 
The non-response analysis revealed that there was in fact no bias in the responding sample. 
Neither of the four non-response variables showed to have any statistical significance (see 
Table 5) nor can it be concluded that the difference between the responding sample and the 
non-responding sample is small enough for the respondents to be a representative sample of 
the whole sample population.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents and Non-Respondents 
Variables Respondents 
(N=41) 
Non-respondents 
(N=62) 
Statistics Significance 
Level 
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IT and software industry        51.2%           40.3% 1.19a .28 
Age          5.20   5.90     -.74b .46 
No of employees    3.88   4.53     -.55b .59 
Turnover (SEK) 1,834,780 3,775,630   -1.63b .11 
Notes: aPearson chi square value; bt-value. Significance levels: *p <.05, and **p <.01.  
 
Although not statistically significant, we can see that the firms who responded were, on 
average, slightly younger, had fewer employees and half the turnover when compared to the 
non-respondents. Yet, as the chi-square test and t-tests conclude, this difference has no effect 
on the representativeness of the respondents within our sample population.  
Furthermore, in order to detect the presence of a bias of reporting only successful ventures 
and thereby addressing the issue of subjective/objective performance measures, a simple 
analysis of means was used on the five performance metrics. The results are shown in Table 6 
and indicate that the respondents on average perceived their performance across the various 
measures as below the expected, with the exception of customer retention rate. Hence, the data 
reveals that the respondents are not only reporting successful ventures. 
 
Table 6: Performance Bias Analysis 
Performance Variables Mean   S.D. 
Sales volume  2.67   .96 
Market share  2.73   .92 
Net profits  2.46   .84 
Number of employees  2.68   .99 
Customer retention rate  3.02 1.04 
 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
Due to the nature of the research certain ethical aspects had to be considered prior to the study. 
It was perceived as particularly important to not harm the relationship between the entrepreneur 
and the business angel. Ethical considerations were identified and handled according to 
Bryman and Bell’s (2011) five points: information requirement, consent requirement, 
confidentiality and anonymity requirement, usage requirement, and false pretences. 
Information requirement. The questionnaire was distributed, featuring a cover letter 
detailing the aims and objectives of the research. This information was also provided at the 
start of the questionnaire and the specific aims of each section of the questionnaire were 
explained at the relevant section. 
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Consent requirement. The sample was informed through the cover letter and the start page 
of the questionnaire that participation is voluntary and that they had the right to exit the study 
at any time without further explanation. 
Confidentiality and anonymity requirement. All responses were guaranteed to remain 
confidential. All participants remained anonymous throughout the research, only the company 
name was used to confirm the inclusion criteria and identify non-respondents. In particular, it 
was emphasised that the responses would not be shared with the ventures respective business 
angel.  
Usage requirement. The data collected was solely used for this specific research. 
False pretences. The respondents were carefully and unbiasedly guided through the study, 
and offered to receive a copy of the final report to ensure no false pretences were given.  
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4. Analysis and Results 
This section presents and analyses the results of our regression model and statistical tests.  
4.1 Regression Analysis 
Our multivariate linear regression was split into two steps (Model I and Model II) in order 
to observe the effects our selected control variables had on performance before and after the 
inclusion of our independent composite variables.  
To check for multicollinearity before running our models, we computed the Pearson r-
correlations and descriptive statistics of all the variables presented in Table 7 below. The two 
largest concerns of collinearity amongst the variables were between the Mentoring and 
Supervision & Monitoring variables and the Mentoring and Sounding Board & Strategic 
variables, which had relatively high correlation values of .82 and -.65 respectively. Due to the 
concerns these high correlation values raised, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were 
checked for all variables. There was no evidence of multicollinearity as all VIF values fell 
between 1.09 and 4.65, well below the suggested VIF standard threshold of 10 (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, and Black, 1998). 
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After testing for multicollinearity, we ran the first step in our regression analysis (Model I) 
which included the block of control variables looking at industry, BA involvement frequency, 
whether not the investment was completed as a syndication or not, and the prior experience of 
the BA as an investor. The results of the regression were a statistically significant model with 
an adjusted R2 of .26. This indicates that Model I weakly fits the data and explains only 26% 
of the variability of the response data around the mean. However, it is still relevant given its 
statistical significance.  
A second block, which included our independent variables, was then added to Model I to 
produce our final regression, Model II. The resulting model was statistically significant with 
an increased adjusted R2 of .38. This indicates that including the independent variables into our 
model with our control variables leads to a 12% increase (∆ Adj. R2 = .12) in the model’s ability 
to accurately explain the variability of the response data around the mean. Therefore it was 
relevant to included value added variables in our model looking at venture performance. The 
complete results of both regressions are presented in Table 8.  
 
Table 7: Regression Analysis 
 
Standardised Coefficients 
Model I Model II 
Model 
I 
Control   
Involvement Frequency .18 .07  
Angel Experience  -.24* -.24* 
Syndicate    -.46** -.26* 
IT Industry -.13 -.19* 
Model 
II 
Independent   
Sounding Board & Strategic -    .36** 
Resource Acquisition -  .31* 
Supervision & Monitoring -    -.50**0                        
Mentoring - .18 
 
 R2 .29 .44 
Adj. R2 .26 .38 
∆ R2 - .15 
∆ Adj. R2 - .12 
F (sign.)   7.98**   7.22** 
Notes: The table reports β (standardized coefficients), R2, adjusted R2, and significance levels *p<.05, and 
**p<.01 
 
A further discussion of the results and the reported effects that the control and independent 
variables have on performance are presented below. 
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4.1.1 Control Variables and Performance 
In both of our regression models, Syndicate and Angel experience were found to be significant. 
Syndicate investments have a negative effect on performance in Model I (p = .00; β = -.46) and 
in Model II (p = .01; β = -0.26). This implies that syndicate investments can hamper the 
performance of a firm when compared to ventures with multiple or individual business angel 
investments in our sample. This can potentially be explained by the free-riding effects and 
duplication of efforts that occur when more than one business angel collaborates in an 
investment (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2008; Jääskeläinen, 2012). Similarly, a BAs prior 
experience as an angel has a negative effect on performance in Model I (p = .02; β = -0.24) and 
in Model II (p = .02; β = -0.24).  
Both variables IT Industry and Involvement frequency were found to be not significant. 
This can be explained by the fact that, for IT Industry, IT and software is such a broad industry 
category for this particular data set while majority of the survey respondents, 51.2% (Table 4), 
were also from this industry. Involvement frequency on the other hand could be insignificant 
as this particular variable does not say anything about the quality or productivity of the time 
spent by the business angel with the venture, only the quantity is communicated. 
4.1.2 Independent Variables and Performance 
Sounding board and strategic role  
As indicated earlier, sounding board and strategic role activities are the most frequently 
reported value added role (Pape, 2014). Model II (Table 8) confirms that the sounding board 
and strategic role has a significant impact on venture performance (p = .01; β = .36). We can 
accept H1 that there is a positive relationship between the sounding board and strategic value 
adding role of a BA and venture performance for this particular sample. 
As Kelly (2007) and Landström (1993) found, relevant industry experience of a business 
angel greatly influence this role while the previous management experience of angels also 
possibly adds value to performance (Shepherd, Douglas, and Shanley, 2000). Initially we 
included industry experience in the model, but it was statistically not significant. This, in 
addition to our attempt to minimize the number of predictors given our small convince sample, 
is why we chose to exclude it in the final regression models. However, Angel experience had a 
statistically significant positive correlation of 32% with Sounding board and strategic role. 
Conversely, our model shows that Syndicate had a significant negative affect on the role. 
As angels pool their resources into a syndicate investment, it is possible that some angels 
decrease their involvement due to free-ridding effects (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2008; 
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Jääskeläinen, 2012). The regression model showed that syndicate investments had a -.22 
correlation with an angel’s involvement frequency. 
Resource acquisition role 
BAs can leverage their personal networks in order to seek more funding or to contribute other 
resources that can add value and affect the performance of a firm (Sætre, 2003; Sørheim, 2005; 
Politis, 2008). Model II (Table 8) confirms that the resource acquisition role has a significant 
impact on venture performance (p = .01; β = .31). We can accept H2 that there is a positive 
relationship between the resource acquisition value adding role of a business angel and venture 
performance for this particular sample.  
Involvement frequency and Syndicate have significant correlation values of .43 (p = .00) 
and -.23 (p = .02) with resource acquisition activities, respectively. New ventures can benefit 
from establishing lasting relationships and building long-term networks that are provided by 
their business angels (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However like the free-rider problem and 
duplication of resources issue occurring in sounding board and strategic value added activities, 
resource acquisition value added activities are negatively affected by syndication investments 
(Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2008).  
Supervision and monitoring role 
Model II confirms that the supervision and monitoring value adding role has a significant 
impact on venture performance (p = .01; β = -0.50), yet the direction is opposite of that assumed 
in the hypothesis. Hence, we cannot accept H3 that there is a positive relationship between the 
supervision and monitoring value adding role of a business angel and venture performance for 
this particular sample. However, a statistically significant negative relationship does exist 
between the supervision and monitoring value role and performance.  
This negative relationship can be described by the fact that BAs can often outstep their 
bounds or make short-term decisions to control financial operations that can hurt the 
performance of a venture in the long run. It is possible that, BAs can steer the venture away 
from the vision and goals that the entrepreneur has defined and set to accomplish (Jääskeläinen, 
Maula, and Seppä, 2006). Often venture capitalist and BA goals are concerned with short-term 
financial values (Landström, 2007) consequently making financial monitoring decision that 
can potentially harm the long-term visions of the firm. 
Angel Experience and IT Industry have significant correlation values of .31 (p = .00) and -
.50 (p = .00) with supervision and monitoring activities, respectively.  
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Mentoring role 
The results of Model II indicate that the mentoring role of BAs does not have a significant 
impact on venture performance (p = .31; β = .18). Thus, we cannot accept H4 that there is a 
relationship between the mentoring value adding role of a BA and venture performance for this 
particular sample. This is possibly due to two main reasons. 
First, some angels have shown to partake in value adding activities as an investor for 
personal reasons and fulfilment (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Ibrahim, 2008). Mentorship role 
activities focus on the direct personal relationship between the BA and entrepreneur. Some 
angels could choose to be a personal mentor and give advice that is focused on the personal 
growth of the entrepreneur or the management team for the pure enjoyment of being a mentor. 
It is difficult to measure the effects that a personal relationship may have on the performance 
of the venture without conducting a separate study.  
Secondly, there are limitations of the study’s sample size that could greatly affect the 
significance level of the mentoring independent variables. Additionally, the Mentoring Role, 
like our other explanatory variables, is a subjective self-reported measure of how entrepreneurs 
believe how much value their BA adds in the mentoring role. Measuring subjectively the value 
added aids in telling a richer story about BAs and the value they add through mentorship 
activities when it is difficult to measure such activities objectively. However, reliability of the 
measure could be affected that weakens statistical power and increasing the risk of a Type I 
error. Future studies could sacrifice a small amount of statistical significance to minimise the 
risks of Type I and II errors (Gabrielsson and Politis, 2012).  
5. Discussion 
It is widely acknowledge in theory and practice that BAs contribute more than simply financial 
capital when investing in new ventures – something literature refers to as value added (Freear, 
Sohl, and Wetzel, 1994; Mason and Harrison, 1995; DeClercq et al., 2006; Kelly, 2007; Politis, 
2008). Despite a number of efforts to categorise and understand the phenomenon better, we 
still know little about what effects value added have on new ventures and how it influences 
new venture performance. This study seeks to fill this theoretical gap by analysing data 
collected through a questionnaire among Swedish ventures with BA funding. Revisiting our 
initial question we sought to answer at the start of this study, we ask again: Does the value 
added by business angels affect new venture performance? On the basis of our results and 
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findings we can conclude that value adding roles do have a significant impact on new venture 
performance, but the nature of the effects is mixed. Firstly, this conclusion confirms the 
theoretical prediction saying that BAs do add value to their portfolio companies, but also 
confirms the theoretical underpinnings of value added having an effect on performance.  
As discussed and argued for in the development of the four hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, and 
H4), we assumed all four value adding roles to have a positive association with performance. 
We acknowledge the differences between the four roles and discuss their respective values to 
the entrepreneur and its venture. In the analysis we find that these differences result in 
significant differences in performance effects for three of our four value adding roles. Both 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 are accepted as the findings show that the sounding board and strategic role 
and the resource acquisition role both have a positive effect on new venture performance. Even 
though we observe a significant effect of the supervision and monitoring role, the direction of 
the relationship is opposite to what was assumed in Hypothesis 3 and it is therefore not 
accepted. Interestingly, mentoring does not show to have a significant effect on performance 
so Hypothesis 4 is not accepted. Taken together, we can conclude that value added by BAs can 
influence venture performance. Next we discuss the limitations that this study has, before 
analysing the implications that our research generates despite these restrictions. Based on the 
limitations and implications of this study we then suggest areas for further research. 
5.1 Limitations 
Their invisible nature and the fact that angels are not legally required to disclose information 
concerning their investments make it difficult to obtain large datasets with information 
regarding their investment activity. This research is based on a relatively small number of 
observations – 41 entrepreneurs with angel funding – which induces certain limitations when 
interpreting the results of the regression analysis. 
Linear regression is based on a number of key assumptions, e.g. a linear relationship 
between the variables and little multicollinearity, and requires a large number of observations 
for the results to have the possibility of being normally distributed (Harrel, 2001). The small 
number of observations included in this research (N=41) significantly challenges these key 
assumptions as there simply is not enough data to ensure that they are met. As a rule of thumb, 
a regression analysis requires at least 10 observations per independent variable (Harrel, 2001), 
meaning that our amount of data could be statistically appropriate for including maximum four 
independent variables. Yet as we are interested in also looking at a number of control variables 
in addition to the four value adding roles we part from this guideline. We are aware of the 
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limitations that this induces on the results, and take that into consideration when interpreting 
and discussing them. Despite the low number of observation we generate a significant 
regression model in which only low levels of multicollinearity are observed. As stated in 
Section 4.1, certain variables are close to or above the generally acceptable correlation limit of 
.70, yet the VIFs are not close to the thresholds that would indicate concerns for 
multicollinearity. Despite the model being significant and no multicollinearity seem to be 
present, we cannot rule out that there is collinearity between variables and therefore the results 
must be interpreted with care. Consequently, variables that show to be significant may in fact 
not be so, and insignificant variables may indeed be significant.  
The representativeness of the sample is limited by using a convenience sample 
(Avdeitchikova, Landström, and Månsson, 2008). Hence, the results may not be representative 
of ventures with angel funding in general but are rather focused on a biased sample of new 
ventures. Yet, as the non-response analysis revealed, the actual observations (N=41) are 
representative of the entire sample population (N=103). The results of the study are not affected 
as such, but the impact of the results is limited. We cannot claim our findings to be general as 
the conclusions of this study are only appropriate to explain the effects on performance 
amongst the responding ventures.  
The use of cross-sectional design limits the causality of the conclusions because the effects 
of value added are not measured over time but rather at one point in time. Hence the direction 
in which the effects are moving cannot be explained in this study, reducing the internal validity. 
Resulting from collecting the data by means of a questionnaire, all information is self-reported 
and only the non-response variables are confirmed using independent data. A bias in the 
information provided by respondents due to subjectivity would lead to unreliable results and 
conclusions. This is something that must be taken into consideration when interpreting the 
results. In addition, the heterogeneous nature of angel investments – each investment having 
its own specifics – makes it difficult to design a questionnaire that can capture all nuances of 
the often highly complex relationship. If availability of data is increased significantly one could 
categorise different types of investment relationships, e.g. only include syndicate investments, 
and thereby better capture issues related to that type of relationship. We do not have sufficient 
amount of data to do so in our study, therefore a more general questionnaire is used. 
Due to the relative newness of this research topic and the value it therefore potentially can 
bring, in this study we focus on raising awareness of this complex research field and start the 
dialogue amongst researchers and practitioners in order to, in the future, make more 
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representative and general studies. We acknowledge all limitations discussed above yet believe 
that the study helps lay the groundwork for future work within the field. 
5.2 Implications 
Despite the limitations, primarily caused by the relatively small dataset, the study generates 
several important implications for both theory and practice. The primary implication of this 
research is that our findings indicate that there exists both a theoretical and a practical value in 
mapping value added by BAs to new venture performance. Our results show an overall 
significant regression model with several significant independent variables. We hope our study 
can stimulate the research field of BAs and value added as there seems to be interesting findings 
and conclusions to be made regarding the theoretical understanding of angels’ investment 
activity as well as mapping the relationship between entrepreneurs and angels in more practical 
terms.  
Furthermore, our findings indicate that certain value adding roles contribute more to firm 
performance than do others. Previous studies claim the sounding board and strategic role is the 
most frequently reported form of value added (Pape, 2014), and our analysis shows that the 
case is true in our responding ventures. Formulating business strategy and serving as a 
sounding board are perceived as particularly valuable. In accordance with literature, our 
findings support that, within the resource acquisition role, ability to assist in obtaining 
additional funding is most sought after amongst entrepreneurs (Sørheim, 2005). All five 
supervision and monitoring activities were, on average, perceived to contribute less than 
acceptable levels of value added, in particular soliciting suppliers, customers and distributors. 
Not only did our results indicate that supervision and monitoring adds the least value to the 
venture, but it also adversely affects performance. This sharply contradicts previous literature 
which assumes it to be a positive relationship (Politis, 2008; Pape, 2014; Kelly, 2007). Pape 
(2014) states that “providing help with finding suppliers and customers” has a significant 
positive effect on performance and directly opposes our findings. Interestingly, however, is 
that Pape (2014) categorises this particular value adding activity into the resource acquisition 
role, whereas we, in accordance with MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1989), categorise it 
into the supervision and monitoring role. Furthermore, Pape (2014) categorises “acting as a 
sounding board” as both part of the sounding board and strategic role and the mentoring role.  
In contrast to Pape (2014), who regresses the performance effects of individual value 
adding activities, we combine individual activities into overarching composite value adding 
roles. By doing so we focus on identifying the effects the major value adding roles have on 
 37 
venture performance rather than individually investigating each of the 19 activities. The 
Cronbach’s alpha values for the four value adding constructed variables range from .81 to .92, 
suggesting that our categorisation of individual activities into the different roles is appropriate. 
Thereby our data supports the inclusion of “soliciting customers, suppliers and distributors” 
into the supervision and monitoring role and “acting as a sounding board” in the sounding 
board and strategic role. However, we do acknowledge that there is room for a deeper 
discussion of the effects of individual activities on performance as we observe a small variance 
within the groupings. Although our dataset supports our categorisation of value adding 
activities, comparisons with similar studies highlight the complexity of categorising value 
adding activities and that there is some overlapping between the value added roles. The 
resulting theoretical implication is that there are certain activities that can belong to more than 
one role and that work still remains to identify and categorise value adding activities. Despite 
a high Cronbach’s alpha, relatively high correlations are observed between certain value adding 
roles in this study and the overlapping of roles may offer an explanation but also a solution to 
this issue. The theoretical framework on which this study relies – the four value adding roles 
identified by Politis (2008) – may not be profound enough yet to use as the underpinning for a 
regression analysis as it induces high variable correlations due to overlapping in value adding 
activities. Improving the identification and grouping of activities may eliminate overlapping 
and perhaps also decrease the correlation between the value adding roles.  
When looking at the β-coefficients from the Model II regression analysis we observe a 
slightly higher positive value for the sounding board and strategic role (.36) compared to 
resource acquisition (.31), indicating that there might be a slight preference in more sounding 
board and strategic advice provided by BAs. However, the absolute value of β for the 
supervision and monitoring role is .50, indicating that the destructive effects of supervision and 
monitoring value added are more pronounced than are the positive effects of both the sounding 
board and strategic role and the resource acquisition role. Several scholars link supervision and 
monitoring activities and agency theory to explain the desires of angels to control their 
investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Politis, 2008; Fili and 
Grünberg, 2014) and claim that it often occurs by taking a place on the venture’s board 
(Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002). However, theoretical arguments for why entrepreneurs demand 
value added through supervision and monitoring are much scarcer. Hence, although literature 
identifies a number of different activities that theoretically are expected to help the angel 
control its investments, few activities are identified that are demanded by the entrepreneurs. 
The significant negative relationship found between supervision and monitoring and 
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performance may indicate that there are discrepancies in the demand and supply for certain 
types of value added. The value adding relationship between business angels and their 
entrepreneurs is not one-directional, but in fact multi-directional, meaning that the entrepreneur 
may demand certain value added and the angel may supply certain value added. As in most 
economic theories, equilibrium occurs when demand equals supply and therefore it is important 
that both the entrepreneur’s demands and the angel’s supply is clearly communicated in theory 
as well as in practice. 
Interestingly, when only looking at the correlation between the supervision and monitoring 
role and the other value adding roles there is a significant positive relationship. This may 
indicate that supervision and monitoring in itself does not translate into a positive effect on 
performance but that it acts through its association with the other value adding roles. 
Furthermore, according to Landström (1993) direct supervision and monitoring by BAs may 
damage the sense of trust in the entrepreneur-angel relationship that in turn could result in 
negative effects on performance. In combination with agency theory, the issue of trust between 
the two parties highlight the importance for angels to control their investments in an appropriate 
way such that the relationship with the entrepreneur is not jeopardised. By clearly 
communicating expectations and boundaries of the angel’s involvement and authority, a good 
relationship can be maintained in terms of supervision and monitoring activities. This also 
reduces the risk for over-involvement and the possibility that the angel steer the entrepreneur 
away from his/her vision and passion, something that other studies have found to have a 
negative effect on venture performance (Pape, 2014). As a concluding remark regarding the 
supervision and monitoring role, literature supports such activities and argue a strong case for 
its assumed positive effects on performance but work still remains to, in practice, perform such 
activities without damaging the trust relationship with the entrepreneur. 
Remarkably, the individual activities that scored the highest in the questionnaire were 
“establishing a professional relationship with the entrepreneur” and “establishing a personal 
relationship with the entrepreneur”, both categorised within the mentoring role. Yet taken 
overall, this role did not appear to have a significant effect on performance. This indicate that 
there may be certain activities provided by business angels that are indeed perceived as value 
adding by the entrepreneur, without translating directly into enhanced performance. In our data, 
the correlation between mentoring and both resource acquisition and supervision & monitoring 
show to be significantly positive. The correlation between mentoring and supervision and 
monitoring is particularly strong, inducing that the better the mentoring activities and angel-
entrepreneur relationship, the better the value added through supervision and monitoring. This 
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is in accordance with the implications discussed in the previous paragraph, where we relate 
agency theory to the relationship between the parties. Hence, although mentoring is perceived 
as value added, both in theory and practice, our data shows that it does not affect new venture 
performance. An important theoretical implication of this finding is that new venture 
performance may not necessarily be an appropriate measure of the quality of value added by 
business angels, particularly with respect to certain types of value added. To better understand 
the impacts of value added through mentoring it might therefore be more appropriate to 
measure it against a different dependent variable. 
As acknowledged by Mason and Harrison (2002), it may take several years, usually five to 
six, before the positive effects of angel investments become visible. The median age of our 
respondents is 3 years old, meaning that the majority of the ventures have not yet reached this 
critical age and it may therefore affect the performance. However, our dataset shows no 
significant relationship between venture age and perceived performance. In addition, neither 
when compared to the collected objective performance data used for the non-response analysis 
(number of employees and turnover) a significant relationship can be observed nor can it be 
assumed that the current investment effects are portrayed in the responding firms’ performance. 
Further, no significant relationship was observed between this objective performance data and 
the perceived performance collected through the questionnaire. However, as previously 
discussed in Section 2.1 using subjective performance measures are considered appropriate 
when measuring the effects of value added. 
The practical implications of our study is that angel investors may wish to focus on 
providing advice on more long-term strategic matters and on obtaining additional funds. On 
the other hand, angels should be wary of being over involved and controlling the entrepreneur 
and the venture to a great extent as this may provoke destructive spirals in the angel-
entrepreneur relationship. Hence, it may be in both the angel’s and the entrepreneur’s best 
interest to clearly communicate commitment and boundaries at the start of the relationship to 
avoid such issues further down the road. Both the angel and the entrepreneur should also be 
aware that there are certain activities that can be valuable without having an impact on 
performance.  
5.3 Further Research  
Based on this analysis and discussion of implications and limitations of this study, there are a 
number of issues that could be stimulated and potentially solved by future research. First, to 
overcome the limitations of the data used in this research, further studies should be conducted 
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with more extensive sets of data, including a larger number of observations from ventures. The 
models used here could also be used with datasets from different areas of the world in order to 
understand how angels operate globally, and perhaps if there are cultural and regional 
differences in their value adding activities. As the BA market in the U.S. is approximately 60 
times larger than that of Sweden (Sohl, 2014), we suggest the American market to be an 
appropriate starting point for such an international comparison. Also the British market is 
significantly larger than the Swedish (Mason and Harrison, 2011) and may provide an 
interesting comparison. Research in venture capitalists have observed significant differences 
in investment behaviour between countries (Sapienza, Manigart, and Vermjer, 1996). Thus, it 
would be interesting to see whether this also applies to BAs as they tend to be more influenced 
by personal characteristics than do venture capitalists. 
Second, the increasing frequency of syndicate investments calls for a more in-depth 
analysis of their effects. The number of observations with syndicate investments in this study 
was considered too low to include the variable in the regression model, but for future studies 
this should be included where data is available. 
Third, this study looked at value added at a given point in time. Changes in value added 
that may naturally occur over time as the venture grows and develops were therefore ignored 
but introduces potential opportunities for future research. It can logically be assumed that as 
the venture changes over time, so does their perception of value added and therefore it may be 
of interest to better understand the dynamism of the BAs and value added. 
Finally, this study only looks at the entrepreneur’s perspective on value added and 
performance. Future studies could combine the entrepreneur’s perspective with that of the BA 
to generate better insights on how value added is perceived from both sides and if there are 
discrepancies in the perception of it between the receiver and the provider. 
6. Conclusion 
This study provided an early investigation into empirically mapping the value added by 
business angels observed in real ventures to the performance of the companies. While limited 
by sample size, it was found that there exists a significant relationship between sounding board 
and strategic, resource acquisition, and supervision and monitoring value adding activities. 
Mentoring value added activities appear to have had no significant relationship with venture 
performance. However, this could be due to the small sample size and other contributing effects 
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that stem from the personal relationship between entrepreneurs and angels that the variable 
captures. 
Overall, sounding board activities and resource activities have a positive effect on 
performance. This is highly due the fact that financing opportunities, networking partnerships, 
and industry and strategic advice are all significant and key value adding activities that 
influence firm performance in the early stage of growth. Conversely, supervisions and 
monitoring activities have a negative effect on performance. This is, perhaps, partially due to 
the fact that angels have short-term financial goals that can steer firms away from their long-
term goals – ultimately hurting the performance of the company. As observed by the 
insignificant effect of value added through mentoring, it is not necessarily so that all value 
adding activities translate into performance effect. Further research should investigate deeper 
into how each role affects performance while control for other factors that we outside the 
bounds of this study. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Cover Letter 
The following cover letter was used when distributing the questionnaire. The letter was sent in 
Swedish or English depending on the entrepreneur. The majority of entrepreneurs were 
Swedish speaking. 
 
Hej X, 
 
Mitt namn är Ragna Landgren och jag studerar en Master i Entrepreneurship vid 
Lunds Universitet. Tillsammans med min partner, Christina Halstead, skriver jag för 
närvarande Masteruppsatsen “Business Angels and Value Added: Does it Affect New 
Venture Performance?”. Studien fokuserar på att undersöka entreprenörers 
uppfattning om “value added” av deras affärsängel. 
 
Vi har identifierat dig och ditt företag som en potentiell deltagare i vår forskning, då 
vi har blivit informerade att ni eventuellt har erhållit en ängelinvestering. Deltagandet 
inkluderar en konfidentiell enkät genom vilken vi försöker kvantifiera din uppfattning 
om hur er affärsängel bidrar/bidrog med “value added”, samt hur du uppfattar ditt 
företags framgång i förhållande till dina förväntningar. Enkäten tar inte mer än 10 
minuter att fylla i, och din erfarenhet av affärsänglar är av stort värde för oss och 
andra entreprenörer.  
 
Deltagande är givetvis frivilligt, men vi hoppas att du vill bidra till att skapa en ökad 
förståelse för den komplexa natur som omfattar affärsänglar. Syftet med studien är att 
stärka relationen mellan entreprenörer och affärsänglar, och genom att bidra med din 
erfarenhet kan du underlätta för andra entreprenörer som söker, eller har fått, 
ängelinvesteringar. Vi är därför oerhört tacksamma för din hjälp. 
 
För att delta i studien, var vänlig följ länken nedan: 
https://ragnalandgren.typeform.com/to/XMYesO 
Notera att ditt deltagande är konfidentiellt och dina svar kommer endast att användas 
för forskningssyfte. 
 
Tveka inte att kontakta mig om du har några frågor eller funderingar, antingen via 
denna mail eller via telefon +46 (0)70 213 9985.  
 
Med Vänliga Hälsningar, 
 
Ragna Landgren och Christina Halstead 
MSc Entrepreneurship - New Venture Creation 
Lund University, Sweden 
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Appendix II: The Questionnaire 
The following questionnaire was distributed amongst the entrepreneurs with business angel 
funding. The questionnaire can also be accessed via: 
https://ragnalandgren.typeform.com/to/XMYesO 
 
 
Dear X,  
 
My name is Ragna Landgren and I am a Master student in Entrepreneurship at Lund 
University. Together with my partner, Christina Halstead, I am currently writing a 
thesis on the effects of value added by business angels on new venture performance, 
incorporating a quantitative study on entrepreneurs’ perception of value added by 
their business angel. 
 
We have identified your firm as a potential participant in our research, as we have 
been informed that you may have received investment from business angels. The 
participation includes a confidential questionnaire through which we seek to capture 
your perception of through which activities your business angel adds most value, and 
also how you perceive your venture’s performance in relation to your expectations. 
The questions take no more than 10 minutes to respond to, and your experience and 
opinions are of great value to us. 
 
Participation is of course voluntary, but we hope that you want to contribute to 
creating a better understanding of the complex nature of business angels. Our 
objective with this research is to strengthen the relationship between entrepreneurs 
and angels, and by providing information on your experience you can facilitate for 
other entrepreneurs who are looking for, or have received, angel funding. 
 
To participate in this student research, please follow the link below to complete the 
questionnaire:  
https://ragnalandgren.typeform.com/to/XMYesO 
Please note that your participation is confidential and that your answers only will be 
used for research purposes in this specific study.  
 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me, either by replying to 
this email or by phone +46 (0)70 213 9985.  
 
We look forward to hearing your opinions. 
 
Kind Regards,  
 
Ragna Landgren and Christina Halstead 
MSc Entrepreneurship - New Venture Creation 
Lund University, Sweden 
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